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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MONTANA
CONSTITUTION AS LEGAL BASES FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE LITIGATION IN MONTANA
Gregory S. Munro*
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
Climate change has impacted and will continue to impact both Mon-
tana's prairie and mountain environments. The northwestern United States
has already experienced temperature increases ranging from 1.5 to 4 de-
grees Fahrenheit, and climate-change experts predict additional increases of
3 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit in this century.' Increased temperatures will
reduce springtime snow packs, strain water supplies, increase insect infesta-
tions, increase wildfires, and substantially decrease habitat for cold-water
fish, such as trout.2 Up to 75 percent of the water in Northwest streams
comes from snowmelt, 3 and "models indicate that by the 2080s there would
be little to no snowpack left."4 This decrease in precipitation will exacer-
bate the State's drought stress,5 which is predicted to lengthen by two
months by that time. 6
On the arid Montana plains, most of the region's water comes from the
High Plains Aquifer, which is being drawn down faster than it can recharge
due to reduced precipitation, and temperature increases will stress the al-
ready precarious water resources.7 Insects will spread north in greater num-
bers after emerging earlier in the spring.8 Wetland ecosystems, such as
prairie potholes, will be affected by temperature increases that could in-
* Professor, University of Montana School of Law, and one of six co-counsel who represented
the petitioners in the Barhaugh v. Montana climate-change litigation filed with the Montana Supreme
Court on May 4, 2011. Comments and questions should be directed to greg.munro@umontana.edu.
The author thanks University of Montana second-year law student Keif Storrar for performing invalua-
ble research, checking footnotes, and assisting in editing.
1. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States
135 (Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo, & Thomas C. Peterson, eds., Cambridge U. Press 2009) (availa-
ble at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf).
2. Id. at 135-137.
3. Steven W. Running, Impacts of Climate Change on Forests of the Northern Rocky Mountains 3
(The U. of Mont. 2009) (available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/RockyClimate-
pages-Proofl50.pdf).
4. Id.
5. "Drought stress" means absence of rainfall for a period of time sufficient to deplete soil mois-
ture and injure plants. See generally 4 New Ency. Britannica 231 (15th ed., 2007); see also 16 New
Ency. Britannica at 494.
6. Running, supra n. 3, at 3.
7. U.S. Global Change Research Program, supra n. 1, at 124.
8. Id. at 126.
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crease as much as 13 degrees Fahrenheit by this century's end.9 Montana's
plains area Indian reservations, which already suffer from water scarcity,
will struggle to adapt to climate change. t0 Simply put, predicted tempera-
ture increases in the arid Great Plains area of Montana will upset the preca-
rious balance that allows agricultural communities to exist in that region.
We must resort to law and the legal process to address the risk posed
by climate change to Montana and its people. As Roger Kennedy, the for-
mer Director of the National Park Service, said of the climate crisis, "action
is required of everyone, every jurisdiction, every court, every legislature-
and across time-along a very long 'now.""'
Section II provides a brief overview of the scientific consensus that
global warming is real and that humans have caused it, before outlining
governments' failure to address the problem. Section III demonstrates that
civil litigation can and should provide a meaningful role in addressing cli-
mate change' 2 by analogizing climate-change litigation to tobacco and as-
bestos litigation. Section IV traces the origins of the public trust doctrine
and how the United States Supreme Court and Montana Supreme Court
have applied the doctrine in the past. Section V argues that the principles
underlying the public trust doctrine make it appropriate for Montana courts
to expand the doctrine to atmospheric water. Section VI expands on that
concept by showing why Montana's 1972 Constitution, and particularly its
right to a clean and healthful environment, requires Montana courts to ex-
pand the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere to protect Montana's envi-
ronment. Section VII outlines the current state of climate-change litigation
in the United States, and Section VIII outlines the state of climate-change
litigation in Montana. Section IX previews where climate-change litigation
is headed in Montana after the Montana Supreme Court's denial of original
jurisdiction in Barhaugh v. Montana. This article concludes in Section X
that Montana's progressive Constitution and public trust caselaw should
play an integral role in what two leading legal climate-change scholars de-
scribe as the overarching themes of climate-change litigation: "(1) disputes
over the appropriate role of government in regulating greenhouse gas emis-
9. Id. at 123.
10. Id. at 128.
11. Roger Kennedy, Foreword, in Burns H. Weston & Tracy Bach, Recalibrating the Law of
Humans with the Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human Rights and Intergenerational Justice x (Vt.
L. Sch. & U. Iowa 2009).
12. This article will use "global warming" to mean heating of the atmosphere, oceans and earth
surfaces caused by trapping of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. "Climate change"
will refer to the abnormal fluctuation of climate caused by global warming.
124 Vol. 73
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sions and (2) efforts to force major corporate emitters to reduce their emis-
sions."13
II. GLOBAL WARMING
A. The Global Warming Problem and Its Consequences
Contrary to the impression one might gain from the media, there is a
scientific consensus that global warming is caused by human activity that
releases greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. 14 This article is based on
three assumptions supported by the majority of scientific evidence: (1)
global warming exists, (2) humans are its cause, and (3) ramifications of
global warming are potentially catastrophic. Consequently, the brief sci-
ence included here is intended to reflect the urgent necessity of turning to
courts to address manmade climate change and not to convince doubters of
its existence.
Global warming is now "unequivocal," based on observations of in-
creases in average temperature of air and oceans, melting ice and snow, and
global rise in sea levels.' 5 The International Panel on Climate Change
("IPCC") makes a "best estimate" that global temperatures will increase
somewhere between 1.8 degrees Celsius (3.2 degrees Fahrenheit) and 4.0
degrees Celsius (7.1 degrees Fahrenheit) by the end of this century. 16 Mea-
sured observations for the past 50 years show that temperature change has
now reached 3,000 meters into the depths of the oceans, which absorb 80
percent of the heat added to the climate system.' 7
Most scientists believe the increase in global temperatures is primarily
due to the observed increase in human-caused greenhouse gas concentra-
tions."' IPCC scientists have concluded that it is "extremely unlikely" that
13. William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview: The Exigencies That Drive Potential
Causes of Action for Climate Change, in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and Interna-
tional Approaches 20, 25-26 (William C. G. Bums & Hari. M. Osofsky eds., Cambridge U. Press
2009).
14. Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 Science 1686 (2004); Anna
T. Moritz, Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, in Climate Change: A Reader 16 (Carolina Aca-
demic Press 2011); see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The
Scientific Basis (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., Cambridge U. Press 2001) (involving 4,000 scientists from
150 countries); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Sci-
ence Basis (Susan Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge U. Press 2007).
15. Richard B. Alley et al., Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2007: The Physical
Science Basis at 5.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 10; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide & Global
Surface Temperature Trends, http://www.c2es.org/facts-figures/trends/co2-temp (accessed Feb. 9,
2012).
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the increases can be explained solely by external forcing. 19 As the concen-
tration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased, so has the tem-
perature. 20 This is consistent with patterns over the past 400,000 years that
show clear correlation between carbon dioxide levels and average global
surface temperatures. 2 1 Ice cores reveal that the concentrations of carbon
dioxide and methane in the atmosphere now far exceed the natural concen-
trations of the last 650,000 years. 2 2 This temperature increase is causing
rising sea levels and decreasing snow cover in the northern hemisphere, 2 3 as
well as significant shrinking of arctic sea ice and normally frozen ground. 2 4
While some projections predicted disappearance of all late-summer sea ice
in the arctic by the end of the century, 2 5 recent computer models show that
it could happen by 2016.26
The stunning thing about the impacts scientists have observed to date
is that they are the result of carbon dioxide emissions from thirty years ago:
The roughly 30-year lag between the emission of CO 2 and its effects on cli-
mate means that the rapid melting of ice caps and glaciers, more severe
droughts, heat waves, and storms visible today are the results of the fuels that
we burned decades ago. In the meantime we have roughly doubled the flow
of carbon into the atmosphere, and as a result are committed to a substantial
further temperature increase. This is not just "global warming," however, but
rather a progressive and accelerating destabilization of the entire planet.27
Perhaps the gravest risk inherent in what may appear to non-scientists
as moderate temperature increases is the triggering of "feedback loops" 2 8
19. A forcing mechanism is a process, like solar irradiance or volcanic eruptions, that "changes the
balance between incoming solar radiation and outgoing infrared radiation from earth." EPA, Glossary
of Climate change Terms, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html (accessed Feb. 23, 2012).
20. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide & Global Surface Tem-
perature Trends, http://www.c2es.org/facts-figures/trends/co2-temp (accessed Feb. 14, 2012).
21. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Long-Term Trends in Carbon Dioxide & Surface
Temperature, http://www.c2es.org/facts-figures/trends/long-co2-temp (accessed Feb. 14, 2012).
22. Alley et al., supra n. 15, at 2.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 7. In 2007, the melting of sea ice "crushed all previous records" and outran the computer
modeling, and that melting continued in 2008 at virtually the same rate even though the temperatures
were cooler than in 2007. Anna T. Moritz, The Progression of Climate Science: Scientific Consensus on
Climate Change in William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., Climate Change: A Reader 16, 20 (Carolina Academic
Press 2011).
25. Alley et al., supra n. 15, at 15.
26. International Polar Foundation, Science Poles, Maslowski and Team Offer New Estimate on
Summer Arctic Sea Ice Disappearance, http://www.sciencepoles.org/news/newsdetaillmaslowski-and-
team offer newestimate-summer_arctic seaicedisappearance (Nov. 4, 2011).
27. David W. Orr, Down to the Wire: Confronting Climate Collapse 3 (Oxford U. Press 2009).
28. "Feedback loop" in global warming means that the predicted temperature increase triggers an-
other process that amplifies the rate of temperature increase. For instance, increased temperature melts
the ice cap, which, instead of reflecting heat away then absorbs heat amplifying the predicted increase in
heat. EPA, Glossary of Climate Change Terms, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html (ac-
cessed Mar. 18, 2012).
HeinOnline  -- 73 Mont. L. Rev. 126 2012
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN MONTANA
that can cause runaway temperature increases. For example, thawing of
permafrost caused by predicted temperature increases will release massive
amounts of methane into the atmosphere. 29 Melting of snow and ice at the
caps and other locations will cause surfaces that formerly reflected light and
heat out of the atmosphere to become dark surfaces that absorb more heat.
Additionally, the absorption of atmospheric carbon dioxide in the
oceans is causing significant ocean acidification, to the point where plank-
ton, coral and shellfish struggle to survive. 30 The loss of these and other
species would mean wholesale destruction of the ocean food web and
ecosystem. 3'
Greenhouse gas emissions at or above the current rates will likely
cause greater climate change in the 21st century than in the 20th century. 3 2
Mountain ecosystems could lose more than half their wildlife species. 33
The IPCC predicts that death and disease caused by severe climate will hit
some of the poorest nations the hardest. 3 4 The IPCC also predicts that
"[t]he resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century by
an unprecedented combination of climate change, associated disturbances
(e.g. flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, ocean acidification) and other
global change drivers (e.g. land-use change, pollution, fragmentation of nat-
ural systems, over-exploitation of resources)."3 5
B. The Failure of Government to Address Climate Change
The failure of governments at both the state and national level to ad-
dress climate change derives from two sources primarily: (1) lack of politi-
cal will of Congress and state legislatures to pass effective legislation, and
(2) lack of effective enforcement of existing legislative regulation due to
outside influences and agency discretion. With regard to lack of political
will, Professor David W. Orr succinctly summed up the problem in Down
29. Thawing of methane ice lattices under the sea floor could also become a new and uncontrolled
source of greenhouse gases causing "extremely rapid climate change." Moritz, supra n. 14, at 20 (citing
T.R. Christensen et al., Thawing Sub-Arctic Permafrost: Effects on Vegetation and Methane Emissions,
31 Geophysical Research Ltrs. L04501 (2004); M. Kennedy et al., Snowball Earth Termination by
Destabilization of Equatorial Permafrost Methane Clathrate, 453 Nature 642 (2008)).
30. James C. Orr et al., Anthropogenic Ocean Acidification Over Twenty-First Century and Its
Impact on Calcifying Organisms vol. 437, 681 (Nat. Publg. Group 2005).
31. Id. at 685.
32. Alley et al., supra n. 15, at 8, 13.
33. James Owen, National Geographic News, Warming May Spur Extinctions, Shortages, Conflicts,
World Experts Warn, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/04/070406-global-warming_2.
html (Apr. 6, 2007) (available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-reportlar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf) (quoting
IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri).
34. Lenny Bernstein et al., Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report § 5.2, 65 (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change 2008); see also James Owen, supra n. 33.
35. Bernstein et al., supra n. 34, at § 3.3.1, 48.
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to the Wire: Confronting Climate Change: "The global crisis ahead is a
direct result of the largest political failure in history."3 6 Orr indicted the
federal government and elected officials, particularly in recent years, for:
* Ignoring the increasingly urgent and rigorous warnings of danger;
* Failing to anticipate ecological and climate trends;
* Making little or no effort to alert the public to the dangers ahead;
* Being oblivious to the security implications of rapid climate change;
* Taking none of the obvious steps to recalibrate the economy to protect
natural capital, including climate stability;
* Doing little to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy; and
* Creating a legacy of debt and deficits both ecological and financial. 37
As the greatest contributor to the greenhouse gases accumulated in the at-
mosphere, the United States govemment has been noticeably reticent to as-
sume any responsibility for addressing climate change in talks at Kyoto,
Copenhagen, or Durban.
After Jim Hansen, the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion's ("NASA") chief climate scientist, testified to Congress in 1988 about
the catastrophic potential of global warming, 32 climate-related bills were
introduced in Congress-none of them were passed.38 Most recently, the
American Power Act, which would have set a declining cap on carbon
emissions with target reduction of 83 percent by 2050, failed to even come
to a floor vote in the United States Senate.39 Congress has not passed any
significant legislation to directly address climate change.
With regard to the lack of effective enforcement of congressional man-
dates, the United States Supreme Court 2007 decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA40 provides an excellent illustration of the problem. Prior to that deci-
sion, and in spite of Congress's dictate in the Federal Clean Air Act4 1 that
the EPA regulate pollutants in the atmosphere, the EPA refused to recog-
nize greenhouse gases as pollutants under George W. Bush's Administra-
tion.42 The EPA issued an endangerment finding 43 only after the Court held
the agency's feet to the fire by ruling that the EPA had a duty to regulate
carbon dioxide gas if the agency determined the gas was a pollutant under
the Clean Air Act.44
36. Orr, supra n. 27, at 6.
37. Id. at 6-7.
38. Moritz, supra n. 14, at 26.
39. Sen. 1733, 11Ith Cong. (Feb. 2, 2010) (as placed on Sen. Legis. Calendar under General Or-
ders).
40. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2006).
42. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 510-513.
43. 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66499 (Dec. 15, 2009).
44. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-529.
Vol. 73128
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Professor Mary Christina Wood, the leading American advocate of
"atmospheric trust litigation," argues that systemic failure of state and fed-
eral environmental regulation in the United States is a root cause of our
inability to deal with global warming.45 Wood notes that environmental
regulation in the United States is delegated to agencies that exercise discre-
tion in granting permits. 46 She makes a persuasive case that in the face of
political and economic forces, agencies charged with protecting the envi-
ronment now function primarily to process and grant permits for polluting
the earth, water, and air.4 7 Wood calls this a "political discretion system of
natural resource management" 48 and argues that it fails to adequately ad-
dress pollution in the United States, leading to the United States' place as
the world's largest contributor to global warming.49 The overarching prob-
lem in the system, as Wood sees it, is that the permit system is designed
around political expediency and the short-term interests of politicians and
corporations. 50 As Wood stated:
Modem environmental law has proved a colossal failure, despite the good
intentions and the hard work of many citizens, lawyers, and government offi-
cials. Notwithstanding the most extensive and complex set of legal mandates
the world has ever known, government is driving runaway greenhouse gas
emissions and resource depletion."'
Wood argues that resurrection of the ancient doctrine of public trust is
the remedy for the failure of this political discretion system to protect the
atmosphere. Under the public trust, the courts would recognize that the
atmosphere is held by all sovereign governments at all levels in trust for the
public, and those governments owe a fiduciary obligation to the trust bene-
ficiaries-the public. 5 2 Public trust assets cannot be exhausted or degraded
for purposes of political expediency or the interests of politicians and cor-
porations. Using this reasoning, under public trust doctrine, the Montana
state government (and other state governments) would owe a fiduciary obli-
gation to its citizens to protect the atmosphere from environmental degrada-
tion.
45. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing The Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Envi-
ronment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism And The Need for A Para-
digm Shift, 39 Enytl. L. 43, 54-61 (Winter 2009).
46. Id. at 55 (citing Laura H. Kosloff & Mark C. Trexler, Consideration of Climate Change in
Facility Permitting, in Global Climate Change 259, 259 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., ABA Publg. 2007)).
47. Wood, supra n. 45, at 55.
48. Mary Christina Wood, CLI Recommendation No. 8: Advance the Sovereign Trust of Govern-
ment to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations, in Burns H. Weston & Tracy
Bach, Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human Rights, and
Intergenerational Justice 78 (Vt. L. Sch. & U. Iowa 2009).
49. Id.
50. Wood, supra n. 45, at 56-58.
51. Id. at 78.
52. Id. at 75-77.
2012 129
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In the twenty plus years since the IPCC issued its first report in 1990,53
neither Congress nor the Montana Legislature has enacted legislation to ad-
dress climate change. From 1990 to 2005, Montana's gross greenhouse gas
emissions increased by 14 percent, while national emissions increased
about 16 percent. 5 4 James Hansen recently said: "The earth's climate is
nearing, but has not passed, a tipping point, beyond which it will be impos-
sible to avoid climate change with far-ranging undesirable consequences."5
Consequently, we must significantly reduce carbon in the atmosphere from
its present level. 5 6
In Montana, the legislature rejected the "Montana Global Warming
Solutions Act," which sought to regulate and reduce greenhouse gases.5 7 In
2005, because of the "profound consequences that global warming could
have on the economy, environment, and quality of life in Montana," Gover-
nor Schweitzer's administration formed the Montana Climate Change Advi-
sory Committee under the Montana Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ").58 The resulting Montana greenhouse gas inventory reported that
Montana's greenhouse gas emissions rate per capita was nearly double the
national average.59 Moreover, Montana's greenhouse gas emissions were
projected to grow by thirty percent over 1990 levels by 2020.60 Montana
emits greenhouse gasses equivalent to 37 million metric tons of carbon di-
oxide annually,6 I about 0.6 percent of total United States greenhouse gas
emissions. 6 2
Montanans per capita emit about forty metric tons of carbon dioxide
per year, which can likely be traced to the State's extensive fossil-fuels
industry, large agriculture industry, and significant transportation dis-
53. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Assessment Report (Cambridge U. Press
1990).
54. Center for Climate Strategies & Montana Department of Environmental Quality, Montana
Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Reference Case Projections 1990-2020 iii (available at http://www.mt
climatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/Ol27Fl3145.pdf) (Sept. 2007).
55. James Hansen, Storms ofMy Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe
and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity 115 (Bloomsbury USA 2009).
56. Id. at 180.
57. Mont. H. 753, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 16, 2007).
58. Montana Climate Change Advisory Committee, Montana Climate Change Action Plan: Final
Report of the Governor's Climate Change Advisory Committee EX-1 (available at http://www.mt
climatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/O127Fl4041.pdf) (Nov. 2007).
59. Id. at EX-2.
60. Id. at 1-6.
61. Carbon dioxide equivalent is a "metric measure used to compare the emissions from various
greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential ("GWP"). Carbon dioxide equivalents are
commonly expressed as 'million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents[.]'" United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Glossary of Climate Change Terms, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
glossary.html (accessed Feb. 20, 2012).
62. Center for Climate Strategies & Montana Department of Environmental Quality, supra n. 58, at
4.
Vol. 73130
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tances.63 The Montana greenhouse gas inventory culminated in 54 recom-
mendations for reducing Montana's carbon footprint by the year 2020,
thereby reducing its emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels. 6 4 The
Legislature was unwilling to adopt any of these recommendations.
After the United States Supreme Court determined in Massachusetts v.
EPA65 that the EPA had a duty to regulate greenhouse gases if it determined
that they contribute to climate change, 66 the EPA determined that green-
house gasses constitute "pollutants" that must be regulated under the Fed-
eral Clean Air Act. 6 7 However, the Montana Environmental Quality Coun-
cil, which is a legislative committee authorized to review administrative
rules proposed by the Montana DEQ, effectively forced the termination of
rule-making aimed at similar regulation.68
Lest we tar all government with the same brush, we should note what
Professor Shi-Ling Hsu calls activity of "subnational actors." 69 These ac-
tivities include: the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement70 initiated
by Seattle Mayor Greg Nickel and including approximately 600 cities; the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of nine northeastern states; 7' Califor-
nia's Global Warming Solutions Act; 7 2 British Columbia's agreement to
adopt similar emission reduction targets and initiate agreement between
other western states and Manitoba;73 and the introduction of a provincial
carbon tax by Quebec. 74 It may be that local actors are taking up the mantle
of protecting the atmosphere. Such initiatives indicate that, though govern-
ments at the national level are not meeting any legal duty to address global
warming, governments of major cities and some states are. Conceivably,
action by those government entities reflects awareness of the importance of
63. Id.
64. Montana Climate Change Advisory Committee, Montana Climate Change Action Plan at
EX-2.
65. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
66. Id. at 501.
67. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (accessed Sept. 23, 2011).
68. Proc. Transcr. Bd. of Envtl. Rev. of the St. of Mont. 4, 21 (Jan. 14, 2010).
69. Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens of a
Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 701, 707 (2008).
70. The U.S. Conference of Mayors, The U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (available at
http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf) (2005).
71. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Welcome, http://www.rggi.org/ (accessed Sept. 23, 2011).
72. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38500 (2006).
73. CBC News, Schwarzenneger, Campbell Formalize Green Agreement, http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/british-columbialstory/2007/05/31/bc-green.html (May 31, 2007); Adam Tanner, U.S., Canadian
West Set Joint Carbon-Cutting Target, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/22/environment-climate-
west-goals-dc-idUSN2244930020070822 (Aug. 22, 2007).
74. CBC News, Quebec to Collect Nation's First Carbon Tax, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal
story/2007/06/07/carbon-tax.html (last updated June 7, 2007).
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climate change and frustration with the federal government's abdication of
responsibility.
III. LITIGATION's ROLE IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Civil litigation can play a critical role in addressing the seemingly in-
tractable problem of climate change. Civil lawsuits present the fossil-fuels
industry with potential exposure to massive liabilities for damages it has
caused. This exposure can create a nearly immediate agent for change. Af-
ter observing what happened in asbestos and tobacco litigation, the mere
filing and reporting of climate change legal actions will likely drive compe-
tent investors and insurers away from the fossil fuels industry because of
the risk involved in its continued operation. State and Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure give plaintiffs in climate litigation the ability to call into a
public court the largest and most sophisticated corporate and government
defendants and to demand accountability for damages foreseeable by reason
of their malfeasance or nonfeasance. Corporate defendants, adept at hiding
their role in climate change, swaying public opinion, or influencing govern-
ment regulators, will find it difficult to avoid that legal process. Plaintiffs
are entitled to extensive discovery, which can expose the institution's role
in causing or failing to address climate change. Lawsuits trigger publicity
and can be reported worldwide in minutes on the internet. The corporation
may have a duty to report the lawsuit as a "contingent liability" in its annual
financial statements to investors and lenders. Moreover, a lone lawsuit has
the potential to trigger additional lawsuits and major legal expenses.
The history of asbestos and tobacco litigation provides a road map for
what could happen to the fossil fuels industry. Even though "asbestosis was
by 1935 widely recognized as a mortal threat affecting a large fraction of
those who had regularly worked with the material,"75 it was not until devel-
opment of modern product-liability law in the 1960s that litigation
presented a threat to manufacturers. 76
After 1960, a forty-year wave of asbestos product cases ensued and by
2002, 730,000 asbestos claimants had filed lawsuits against 8,400 compa-
nies.77 By 2006, $36 billion in claims had been paid out by United States
insurers and reinsurers toward an estimated total payout that could range
from $200 to $265 billion, making it the largest mass toxic tort claim in
75. Barry I. Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects 33 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers 2005).
76. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a) (1964); Am. Acad. of
Actuaries' Mass Torts Subcomm., Overview of Asbestos Claims Issues and Trends 5 (Am. Acad. of
Actuaries, Aug. 2007).
77. Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation (RAND Inst. for Civ. Just. 2005).
132 Vol. 73
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American history.7 8  Recent studies indicate that 100 million Americans
suffered significant occupational exposure to asbestos,79 and 80 corpora-
tions have reportedly filed bankruptcy as a result of the asbestos claims.8 0
In essence, civil litigation developed to address this massive environmental
problem and to place the burden of compensating those injured by asbestos
on manufacturers.
Tobacco litigation has a parallel history in which the industry won
successive waves of suits from 1954 through 199281 and did not suffer its
first adverse verdict until 1988.82 However, the dam began to break in
1992, when the Supreme Court ruled that the 1965 law requiring cigarette
warning labels did not preempt plaintiffs' claims that they had been
deceived about the health effects of smoking.83 In 1994, a coalition of 60
Louisiana attorneys filed the "Castano case" against the industry, 84 which
became the largest class-action lawsuit in history. 5 That same year, Mis-
sissippi became the first of many states to file suit against the tobacco in-
dustry to recover Medicaid expenditures caused by treating smokers. 86 By
1997, so many states had joined the "pile-on" that tobacco was ultimately
forced to enter a "Master Settlement Agreement." It required the industry
to pay tobacco-related health care costs incurred by the states' Medicaid
programs, to pay in perpetuity certain costs of caring for persons with to-
bacco related illnesses, to cease specified marketing practices (including
marketing to children), to fund an anti-smoking advocacy group, and to
dissolve the three tobacco industry groups responsible for misinformation
regarding tobacco.87 Subsequently, the industry has been subject to many
product lawsuits and some sizeable verdicts. As in asbestos, this mass
toxic-tort-producing industry was forced by civil litigation to bear the bur-
den of a significant part of the damages it had caused and is causing.
78. Am. Acad. of Actuaries' Mass Torts Subcomm., supra n. 76, at 5.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at I1.
81. Gene Boric, Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century 1950-1999-The Battle is Joined, "The
Eighties," http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/TobaccoHistory20-2.html (accessed Sept. 16,
2011).
82. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986) (Liggett was filed in
1983, and resulted in a $400,000 financial award in 1988-the first ever in a liability suit against a
tobacco company.)).
83. Borio, supra n. 81, at "The Nineties: The Millenia Approaches."
84. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
85. Borio, supra n. 81, at "The Nineties: The Millenia Approaches." The case certified a class of
the millions of persons who smoked the defendants' cigarettes and were dependent on nicotine. Cas-
tano, 84 F.3d 734.
86. Borio, supra n. 81, at "The Nineties: The Millenia Approaches"; The Tobacco Control Re-
source Center, The Multi State Master Settlement Agreement and The Future of State and Local Control,
http://www.tobacco.neu. edu/tobacco-control/resources/msal (Nov. 23, 1998).
87. The Tobacco Control Resource Center, supra n. 86.
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The asbestos and tobacco liability stories are not lost on the fossil fuels
industry. Those who finance and insure the industry recognize that those
stories are likely bellwethers for the fossil fuels industry. In the case of
both the tobacco and asbestos, seemingly impregnable bastions fell under
the pressure of increasing claims. In the last four years, hundreds of climate
change legal actions have been filed in the United States against the fossil-
fuels industry and various governmental entities.88 Any chief executive of-
ficer, risk manager, insurer, or investor involved in the fossil fuel industry
that looks at the history of asbestos and tobacco litigation should have
nightmares about the risk of climate-change liability that could dwarf the
liability of tobacco and asbestos. Any global warming lawsuit filed today is
likely to draw the attention of the fossil fuels industry and its trade groups,
as well as corporations emitting greenhouse gasses and their insurers and
investors. 89 Those entities have likely paid close attention to such cases as
Massachusetts v. EPA, 90 Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,91
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. ,92 and Native Village of Kivalina v. Exx-
onMobil Corp. 93
Moreover, there are numerous indicators that climate change will re-
sult in mass tort litigation. First, the proliferation of hundreds of lawsuits in
the last four years indicates that legal action is becoming a preferred
method to confront climate change. Though the legal hurdles of standing,
preemption, and political question have whittled away many of those law-
suits, it does not appear that any court has made a finding that disputes that
global warming exists or that humans are its cause. The battles being
fought in court today will serve as the foundation for future legal actions.
Second, based on the large damage awards in tobacco and asbestos litiga-
88. For an excellent comprehensive chart of the climate change legal actions, prepared by the law
firm of Arnold & Porter LLP, see Michael B. Gerrard & J. Cullen Howe, Climate Change Litigation in
the U.S., http://www.climatecasechart.com (accessed Sept. 18, 2011).
89. Id.
90. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (In a suit by Massachusetts to force the EPA to engage in rulemak-
ing to prevent climate change, the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts had standing because of
damage to the State's coastline. Further, the Court held that the Clean Air Act authorized EPA regula-
tion of greenhouse gases and the EPA could avoid regulation only if it determined greenhouse gases did
not contribute to climate change.).
91. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (suit
for nuisance tort brought by eight states and New York City against the five largest fossil-fuel-fired
electric power plants in the United States).
92. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'd, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (Mississippi landowners whose property was damaged during Hurricane Katrina sued certain
oil, coal, and chemical companies under negligence, nuisance, trespass and conspiracy to commit fraud,
claiming the defendants' emissions exacerbated the intensity of the hurricane).
93. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (public
nuisance suit by Native Village against certain oil and energy companies alleging destruction of the
village by melting of arctic sea ice that once protected its coastal area from destruction by winter
storms).
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tion, people injured by climate change have a strong incentive to file legal
claims. Indeed, the massive damages obtained by plaintiffs in tobacco and
asbestos litigation would pale in comparison with the damage awards of
litigants subject to the potentially catastrophic consequences of global
warming. Third, the fossil fuels industry and governments all over the
world were put on notice of global warming, its causes, and potential conse-
quences in the first report of the IPCC over twenty years ago.94 Thus,
plaintiffs can claim potential corporate and government defendants had no-
tice of the damages they were causing sufficient to place on them a duty to
avoid the injuries. Arguably, action taken 20 years ago could have avoided
the crisis we face today. Fourth, as in asbestos and tobacco litigation, the
trial bar can be expected to continually hone winning legal theories neces-
sary to address climate change in court, while climate experts are develop-
ing the technical expertise to prove causation and damages. Fifth, each year
the effects of global warming become more obvious, provable, and compel-
ling to the public.9 5 These factors all dictate that climate change litigation
in the judicial arena will play a major role in addressing global warming.
A potential investor would, obviously, not invest in a coal-fired gener-
ator that is expected to make its financial return over a period of 50 years
when there is a significant risk the generator may be shut down in five or
ten years. Commercial General Liability insurance policies provide both
indemnity against liability and unlimited defense of claims. 96 How long
will insurers sell environmental liability endorsements to a coal-fired power
plant likely to become the subject of mass tort litigation? 97
But, civil litigation cannot effectively address climate change by in-
voking laws and regulations developed by the "political discretion" system
that has condoned the pollution that created the climate crisis. The courts
must turn to common law that can provide a substantive basis for protecting
society from climate change, and the public trust doctrine has the greatest
potential to fill the void.
94. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, First Assessment Report (Cam-
bridge U. Press 1990).
95. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Climate Change: How Do We Know?, http://
climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ (accessed Jan. 11, 2012).
96. Susan J. Miller & Philip Lefebure, Miller's Standard Ins. Policies Ann., vol. 1, 403.1 (West
Publg. 2009).
97. For consideration of the impact of climate change on insurers and insurance and the industry's
response, see Gregory S. Munro, Insurance and Climate Change, Trial Trends: A Quarterly Publication
of the Mont. Trial Lawyers Assn. 26 (Summer 2010); Jeffery W. Stempel, Insurance and Climate
Change Litigation, in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International Approaches 230
(William C. G. Burns & Hari. M. Osofsky eds., Cambridge U. Press 2009).
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IV. ORIGIN OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE COURTS'
RECOGNITION OF IT
A. Ancient Foundations of the Doctrine
Professor Mary Christina Wood argues that law can only address the
atmospheric pollution causing global warming by imposing common-law
trust theory on the air we breathe. 98 The public trust doctrine has an ancient
lineage that reflects that certain resources are, by their nature, public. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court aptly put: "The genesis of this principle is
found in Roman jurisprudence, which held that '[b]y the law of nature' 'the
air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea' were
'common to mankind."' 99 The Roman Emperor Justinian is credited with
having laid the foundation for this doctrine by declaring that certain ele-
ments of the environment should be protected: "The things which are natu-
rally everybody's are: air, flowing water, the sea, and the sea-shore." 00
The public trust doctrine requires the government to act as a trustee, to
maintain some level of quality in the resources, and to protect those re-
sources from being depleted by private interests or expended to the detri-
ment of future generations."o0
The foundation of the public trust doctrine is the government's author-
ity to supervise and control the natural resource that is the subject of the
trust. 10 2 Normally, political leaders, in the exercise of their offices, have
wide latitude to balance interests and mediate disputes between competing
interests. However, they are much more restricted when they wear the hat
of a trustee over a public resource. A trustee has the duty to protect the
trust property.103 A trustee may not act in his own interest or the interest of
any third party but must act with utmost good faith toward the benefici-
ary.104 Hence, a trustee's duty may forbid balancing of interests or trade-
offs that would damage or deplete the resource.
98. Wood, supra n. 45, at 45.
99. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assn., 471 A.2d 355, 360 (N.J. 1984) (quoting Justinian,
Institutes 2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans. 1st Am. ed., 1876)).
100. Caesar Flavius Justinian, The Institutes of Justinian, Book II, Title I, Of the Different Kind of
Things 533 (Oxford Press 1996).
101. For writings about the development of the public trust doctrine in American courts, see Joseph
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L.
Rev. 471, 558-566 (1990); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of Ameri-
can Property Law, 19 Envtl. L. 515 (Spring 1989); Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens
Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 Duke Envtl. L.
& Policy Forum 57 (Fall 2005).
102. Nat'l Audubon Socy. v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Co., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
103. Iverson v. Rehal, 317 P.2d 869, 872 (Mont. 1957).
104. Wild West Motors, Inc. v. Lingle, 728 P.2d 412, 416 (Mont. 1986).
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B. United States Supreme Court Adoption of Public Trust Doctrine
The United States adopted the public trust doctrine from English com-
mon law in order to protect public commerce along navigable waters.t 05
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine in 1892 in
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois. I0 6
The possession by private individuals of lands under them could not be per-
mitted except by license of the crown, which could alone exercise such do-
minion over the waters as would insure freedom in their use so far as consis-
tent with the public interest. The doctrine is founded upon the necessity of
preserving to the public the use of navigable waters from private interruption
and encroachment, a reason as applicable to navigable fresh waters as to wa-
ters moved by the tide. 07
In Illinois Central Railroad Company, the Court reversed the granting of
shoreline property on Lake Michigan to a railroad company:
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can
abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preser-
vation of the peace. 108
Hence, in one stroke the Court established that all navigable waters in the
United States and the lands under them are held in public trust by the gov-
ernment for the public interest.
The Court furthered the public trust doctrine in Geer v. Connecticut in
1896.109 Geer involved ownership of feral game in a case involving hunt-
ing violations.110 The Court discussed ancient law and English common
law regarding the public trust over air and water, and, in speaking of those
things that remain in common ownership, quoted renowned 18th-century
French legal scholar Robert Joseph Pothier,tt" who said: "These things are
those which the jurisconsults called 'res communes.' Marcien refers to sev-
eral kinds, the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its
shores."I 12 Referring to the common property of game, the Court set forth
the duty of government:
[T]he development of free institutions had led to the recognition of the fact
that the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common
105. Weston & Bach, Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the Laws of Nature at 43.
106. Ill. C R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
107. Id. at 436.
108. Id. at 453.
109. Geer v. Conn., 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled, Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
110. Geer, 161 U.S. at 519.
11. Robert Joseph Pothier was a renowned 18th century French lawyer and professor who arranged
the texts of the Roman Law. Auguste Boudinhon, Robert Joseph Pothier, http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/12321a.htm (accessed Jan. 16, 2012).
112. Geer, 161 U.S. at 525.
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ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust
for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the
government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of private individu-
als as distinguished from the public good. 13
In 1907, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated: "[T]he state
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain."I14 Recently, the United States Supreme
Court has also recognized that "individual States have the authority to de-
fine the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private
rights in such lands as they see fit."' 15
C. Recognition of Public Trust Doctrine by the Montana
Supreme Court
The Montana Supreme Court has invoked the public trust doctrine to
protect its waterways. In 1984, in Montana Coalition for Stream Access,
Inc. v. Curran,"'6 the Court used the public trust doctrine as one basis for its
decision to recognize the public's right to use the waters and streambed of a
river up to its high water mark as it flowed through a private landowner's
property." 7
In Curran, Curran and Curran Oil Company held land along six to
seven miles of the Dearborn River.118 Curran attempted to restrict public
access for fishing and floating, claiming title to the banks and streambed of
the river and the right to restrict public use.119 The trial court determined
the Dearborn River was navigable in 1889, the year Montana gained state-
hood, by applying the federal "log-floating" test.120 Because the river was
navigable, the trial court concluded the riverbed was owned by the federal
government prior to statehood and was transferred to the State of Montana
at the time of statehood.121 The Montana Supreme Court upheld that deci-
sion based upon the public trust doctrine.12 2 The Court also recognized that
the State, as an attribute of its sovereignty, could determine as a matter of
local law which rivers were navigable and therefore part of the public
trust.12 3 Moreover, the Court recognized that public recreational use, such
113. Id. at 529.
114. Ga. v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
115. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
116. Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1894).
117. Id. at 172.
118. Id. at 165.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 166.
121. Id.
122. Curran, 682 P.2d at 170.
123. Id. at 167.
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as fishing and floating, was a basis for declaring a river navigable in Mon-
tana and, therefore, worthy of public trust designation.124 Finally, the Court
held the public's right to use the river extended up to the high water mark
on the banks, thereby determining the boundaries of the public trust.12 5
The Curran Court determined that navigability for use, as opposed to
navigability for title, is determined under state law.126 Ultimately, the
Court stated:
If the waters are owned by the State and held in trust for the people by the
State, no private party may bar the use of those waters by the people. The
Constitution and the public trust doctrine do not permit a private party to
interfere with the public's right to recreational use of the surface of the State's
waters. 127
Most importantly, the Court concluded by expressly founding its decision
on the public trust doctrine and the Montana Constitution: "In sum, we hold
that, under the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any
surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the
public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for non-recre-
ational purposes." 28
In the same year as Curran, in Montana Coalition for Stream Access,
Inc. v Hildreth,129 the Court again invoked the public trust doctrine after a
landowner challenged the public's right to access by way of Hildreth's
ranch.130 Hildreth erected a fence to block floaters on the Beaverhead
River where it crossed his land.' 3' The Court affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing that the public had the right to access the river up to the high water
mark.13 2 The Court articulated that the legal foundations for its decision
were the public trust doctrine and the Montana Constitution.13 3
Because Curran and Hildreth established that all Montana waters suit-
able for recreational use were held and protected in the public trust, damage
to navigable waters from climate change implicates the public trust doc-
trine. The government, as trustee, should not be permitted to ignore climate
124. Id. at 169.
125. Id. at 172.
126. Id. at 170.
127. Id.
128. Curran, 682 P.2d at 171. Curran is in accord with the famous case of Natl. Audubon Socy. v.
Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), which held that the public trust doctrine restricted how much
water California authorities could divert from Mono Lake's tributaries to be consumed by the city of Los
Angeles. The California Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine applied because the public
used the lake for recreation. Id. at 719.
129. Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984), overruled on
other grounds, Gray v. City of Billings, 689 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1984).
130. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1093.
131. Id. at 1090.
132. Id. at 1091.
133. Id. at 1093.
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change that will, for instance, dewater rivers and lakes and raise water tem-
peratures causing the loss of fish and aquatic plants. In addition, the gov-
ernment should administer the public trust doctrine to prevent Montana's
waters from being polluted by discharges, such as mercury and carbon di-
oxide, from coal-fired electrical generators.
In 2002, in what is known as the "Missouri Drainage Case," the Court
expanded the application of the public trust doctrine to protect appropria-
tion of in-stream water flows for the public. 134 During adjudication of
water claims in the Missouri River Basin, the Montana Fish, Wildlife and
Parks Department filed five claims in the Water Court, asserting water
rights for fish, wildlife, and recreational purposes.' 3 5
Although the Montana Supreme Court declined to recognize such a
right 14 years earlier in In re Dearborn Drainage Area (known as the Bean
Lake Case),136 in the Missouri Drainage Case the Court reversed itself,
recognizing that "[u]nder the Constitution and the public trust doctrine, the
public has an instream, non-diversionary right to the recreational use of the
State's navigable surface waters."1 3 7 The Missouri Drainage Case Court
reasoned that the decision in Curran was based on "not only the 1972 Con-
stitution, but also the public trust doctrine which dates back to Montana's
statehood."' 38 Overruling the Bean Lake Case, the Court held that fish,
wildlife, and recreational use are "beneficial uses" for the purposes of
water-appropriation claims.' 39 Further, the Court held that water-appropria-
tion claims for these non-diversionary uses were valid and existed prior to
1973. 140
The Missouri Drainage Case is in accord with the California Supreme
Court's seminal 1983 decision, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
of Alpine County.141 There, the California Supreme Court held that the
public trust doctrine protected non-navigable tributaries of Mono Lake, a
navigable water body, from diversions by the city of Los Angeles. The
Court rooted its expansion of the public trust doctrine in the doctrine's elas-
tic nature: "The objective of the public trust has evolved in tandem with the
changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways." 4 2 Like-
134. In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, 55 P.3d 396 (Mont. 2002)
[hereinafter Missouri Drainage Case].
135. Id. at 398.
136. In re Dearborn Drainage Area, 766 P.2d 228, 236 (Mont. 1988) [hereinafter Bean Lake Case],
overruled, Missouri Drainage Case, 55 P.3d 396.
137. Missouri Drainage Case, 55 P.3d at 404; accord Natl. Audubon Socy., 658 P.2d at 719.
138. Missouri Drainage Case, 55 P.3d at 404 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 407.
140. Id.
141. Natl. Audubon Socy., 658 P.2d 709.
142. Id. at 719.
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wise, the public trust doctrine in Montana has expanded from protecting
only commercial uses to protecting recreational uses and instream water
flows.14 3 Montana's Missouri Drainage Case and California's National
Aududon Society decision constitute a precedential foundation for protect-
ing navigable waters from damage arising from climate change.
While in Curran and Hildreth the Court appeared to apply the public
trust doctrine apart from the Montana Constitution, in the 1987 case Galt v.
State ex rel. Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks,144 the Court indicated
that the doctrine arose from the Montana Constitution:
In Curran, we held that under the public trust doctrine as derived from the
Montana Constitution the public has a right to use any surface waters capable
of use for recreational purposes up to the high water marks and may portage
around barriers in the water in the least intrusive manner possible. This hold-
ing was reaffirmed in Hildreth. 14-5
In fact, the Galt Court identified Article IX, § 3 as the precise location of
the public trust doctrine for water rights under the Montana Constitution,
stating:
The public trust doctrine is found at Article IX, Section 3(3), of the Montana
Constitution which provides: "All surface, underground, flood and atmos-
pheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state
for the use of its people and subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
provided by law."l 46
While simultaneously invoking the public trust doctrine and identifying its
constitutional foundation, the Galt Court actually put its first limits on the
doctrine as applied to recreational rights on rivers by overturning statutes
which purported to give the public rights to make portages onto private land
around obstacles in the river and to build duck blinds and permanent moor-
ings within the high water marks. 147 The Court said those were not within
the rights necessary to public use of the waters.14 8
In summary, the public trust doctrine has been repeatedly invoked to
protect navigable waters in Montana and has expanded to include even in-
stream appropriations. Galt and Hildreth established that the public trust
doctrine has its basis in common law and in Article IX, § 3(3) of the Mon-
tana's 1972 Constitution.14 9 The expansion of public trust by the Missouri
143. The Montana Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the public trust doctrine's application to non-
navigable, in-stream flows of navigable waters in Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co.,
255 P.3d 179 (Mont. 2011), where it held that a private organization had standing to enforce the public
trust protection of in-stream flows of the Big Hole River, id. at 186.
144. Galt v. Mont. by and through Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987).
145. Id. at 913.
146. Id. at 914-915.
147. Id. at 915-916.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 914; Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091.
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Drainage Case to protect in-stream waterflow should be heartening to those
advocating for public trust protection of the air. The question is: why
should we not apply the protections of public trust doctrine in Montana to
the air?
V. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO AIR
A. The Flexible Nature of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine in Montana should extend to protect the air.
Application of the doctrine to waters serves as the doctrine's foundation but
not its limits. While the public trust doctrine has never been extended to
air, applying the foundational principles of the doctrine will protect the air
by creating a cognizable tort action against polluters and restricting the gov-
ernment's licensing of its pollution.
Courts in other jurisdictions have indicated that the public trust doc-
trine is flexible and can be applied to meet society's changing needs. In
2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court said: "The public trust, by its very nature,
does not remain fixed for all time, but must conform to changing needs and
circumstances." 5 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court similarly stated in
1984: "Archaic judicial responses are not an answer to a modern social
problem. Rather, we perceive the public trust doctrine not to be 'fixed or
static,' but one to 'be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and
needs of the public it was created to benefit."" 51 And the Washington
Supreme Court explained in 1998: "Since as early as 1821, the public trust
doctrine has been applied throughout the United States 'as a flexible
method for judicial protection of public interests . ... ' "152
Several state constitutions include provisions recognizing public trust
over air. For example, Article I, § 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pro-
vides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Penn-
sylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Com-
monwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the peo-
ple.' 53
Article XI, § 1 of the Hawaii Constitution provides:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natu-
150. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000).
151. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 (quoting Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea,
294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)).
152. Weden v. San Juan Co., 958 P.2d 273, 283 (Wash. 1998).
153. Pa. Const. art. I, § 27.
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ral resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and
shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of
the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people.154
The Louisiana Constitution provides in Article IX, § 1:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful,
scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected,
conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health,
safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to imple-
ment this policy.155
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act recognizes a cause of ac-
tion in any person or entity against any person or entity "for the protection
of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from
pollution, impairment or destruction." 5 6 That section is based on Article
IV, § 52 of the Michigan Constitution which provides: "The conservation
and development of the natural resources of the state are hereby declared to
be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety and
general welfare of the people." The statute and constitutional provision
have been recognized as imposing a public trust over the air.'5 7
B. Policy Analysis of Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to Air
The policy underlying the public trust doctrine in Montana applies to
the atmosphere as well as it does to water. One could argue that the public
trust doctrine precedent only recognizes protection of the use of the water
and access by shoreline but not the quality of the water. Such an argument
would deny public trust for protecting air quality. However, by its nature,
degradation of water also takes away "use" and even access to navigable
water. If a private party is permitted to dump chemicals in navigable Mon-
tana waters, making them so toxic or offensive as to preclude recreational
or agricultural use, the public trust doctrine could be invoked to protect
those waters. The public trust doctrine should also protect against pollution
that makes air incompatible with the earth's temperature control and unfit
for human breathing or even recreation.
Why should the public trust doctrine apply to navigable water and not
to the atmosphere? Some may object to using the public trust doctrine to
protect air because air moves and no single government or level of govern-
ment could assume or be burdened with a fiduciary trust responsibility over
154. Haw. Const. art XI, § 1.
155. La. Const. art. IX, § 1.
156. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1202 (repealed 1994).
157. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ont. v. Det., 874 F.2d 332, 337 (6th Cir.
1989).
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it. This argument is not credible because rivers also flow through many
jurisdictions. The Madison, Gallatin, and Jefferson Rivers, for example,
meet in Montana to form the Missouri, which flows through Montana,
North Dakota, and Minnesota before joining the Mississippi, which then
flows through multiple states on its way to the Louisiana Delta. Yet it is
likely that the entirety is protected by the public trust doctrine and that any
state along the way could exercise a fiduciary responsibility for protection
of the waters within its boundaries. Furthermore, individual states have
clean air acts and clean water acts by which they assume responsibility for
air and water moving through and over their states.15 8
The more pertinent inquiry is: In what manner, if any, are the nature of
air and water different so as to justify a refusal to apply public trust to air?
For example, one might argue that navigable waters are contained in the
geographic vessels of oceans, lakes, rivers, and streams, whereas the air is
everywhere. An understanding of the global reach of the oceans and rivers
and the hydrologic cycle, however, makes that distinction dubious. Hence,
the Montana Constitution includes "atmospheric waters" in the public trust.
Global warming is impacting the world's oceans, which are the main ab-
sorbers of the heat from global warming and whose temperature change
from such warming reaches now to 3,000 meters below the surface.15 9
Global warming affects the earth's air in the same way as it affects oceans,
rivers, and lakes.
The objection that the public trust doctrine was developed only to pro-
tect navigable waterways is not persuasive, given that it is the recognition
of the doctrine that is important, not what it has been applied to in the past.
If, as the seminal cases suggest, public use of navigable waters deserves
public trust protection because they are used as avenues of human com-
merce, then the airways also deserve protection as a modern locus of trans-
portation for people and cargo.
The public trust doctrine has been invoked in situations where the law
appears to provide no effective protection for a vital resource. In the case
of the atmosphere, existing statutory schemes for atmospheric protection
have not only failed to halt degradation that results in global warming, but
they have sanctioned it under a permit regime.
Ultimately, other than a blunt refusal to admit that cases recognizing a
public trust in waters could also be precedent for recognizing a public trust
in air, there appears no reason why the public trust doctrine should not be
158. The Clean Air Act requires each state to implement statutes that comply with its requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006). For a collection of those state statutes, see Environmental Protection
Agency, Compliance & Enforcement Through State Government: State Review Framework, http://www.
epa.gov/compliance/state/srflindex.html (last updated Jan. 23, 2012).
159. Alley et al., supra n. 15, at 5.
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applied for the protection of the atmosphere. The courts should recognize
an atmospheric trust under which governments have a fiduciary responsibil-
ity for maintaining the atmosphere for this and future generations. Courts
cannot leave the protection of the air to the political discretion of governing
bodies that have created the global warming crisis and its attendant climate
change.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION IN MONTANA
A. Implications of Montana's Constitutional Provisions
The Montana Constitution provides foundational underpinnings for ap-
plication of the public trust doctrine to climate change. Most public trust
doctrine cases discussed above appear to recognize common law as the ba-
sis of the doctrine. The Galt Court recognized, however, that the public
trust doctrine in Montana is "derived from the Montana Constitution."1 60 If
the public trust doctrine in Montana arises Article IX, § 3(3) of the Montana
Constitution, as Galt indicated, we must begin by looking at the scope of
the public trust in the context of Article IX, § 3:
Water rights. (1) All existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or
beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed. (2) The use of all
water that is now or may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rent, distribution,
or other beneficial use, the right of way over the lands of others for all
ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts necessarily use in connection
therewith, and the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing
water shall be held to be a public use. (3) All surface, underground, flood and
atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the
state for the use of its people and subject to appropriation for beneficial uses
as provided by law.161
The Galt Court cited subsection 3 as the basis of public trust imposition on
waters.162 Because § 3 is titled "Water rights" and its content relates to
impoundment and distribution of water, one could argue that insofar as it is
a basis for public trust, it simply applies to water. However, because sub-
section 3, expressly includes "atmospheric waters," it necessarily includes
the atmosphere. Consider whether, under that provision, one group could
be precluded from extensive cloud seeding that would produce rain on its
agricultural land and drought for anyone downwind. The public trust then
would appear to expressly reach and protect such "atmospheric waters"
from such diversion.
160. Galt, 731 P.2d at 913.
161. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3 (emphasis added).
162. Galt, 731 P.2d at 913.
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More expressly, because Article IX, § 1 mandates: "The legislature
shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life
support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent
unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources," it is also an
avenue by which the public trust doctrine could govern the air. The drafters
of Article IX, § 1 intentionally protected "the environmental life support
system" and not just the water. At the 1972 Montana Constitutional Con-
vention, Delegate C.B. McNeil articulated that:
Subsection 3 mandates the Legislature to provide adequate remedies to pro-
tect the environmental life-support system from degradation. The committee
intentionally avoided definitions, to preclude being restrictive. And the term
"environmental life-support system" is all-encompassing, including but not
limited to air, water and land; and whatever interpretation is afforded this
phrase by the Legislature and courts, there is no question that it cannot be
degraded.163
The two sections, taken together, are a basis for the courts' imposition of
the public trust doctrine over atmospheric litigation in Montana. Hence,
common law, as expressed in Curran and Hildreth, establishes the public
trust doctrine while the Montana Constitution provides the basis for its ex-
tension to protection of the air. It is clear that the public trust protections in
the Montana Constitution, to the extent they are expressed or implied, ex-
tend to the "environmental life support system" which encompasses the air
and certainly to "atmospheric waters."
B. The Right to, and Protection of a Clean and Healthful Environment
Montanans take pride in what they consider to be strong environmental
provisions in Montana's 1972 Constitution. Because constitutional provi-
sions are the primary statements of public policy in Montana,16 it is impor-
tant to examine and analyze the environmental provisions of the Constitu-
tion insofar as they may provide a legal basis for climate-change litigation.
While efforts to place environmental rights in the United States Con-
stitution have failed, "[m]ore than a third of all state constitutions, including
all written since 1959, address modern concerns of pollution and resource
preservation."l 6 5 The movement among the states to "constitutionalize the
163. Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 168
(Greenwood Press 2001) (emphasis added); see also Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings
vol. 4, 1201 (Mont. Legis. & Legis. Council 1972) (available at http://courts.mt.govlibrary/montana-
laws.mcpx).
164. See e.g. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Mont.
1984); State ex rel. McCarten v. Corwin, 177 P.2d 189, 194 (Mont. 1947).
165. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Mon-
tana's Environmental Provisions, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 157, 158 (2003).
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environment" has also come to Montana. 166 Montana's 1972 Constitution
makes a "right to a clean and healthful environment" the first inalienable
right guaranteed to Montanans.16 7 However, surprisingly few environmen-
tal lawsuits invoke such constitutional provisions, relying instead on statu-
tory claims.168 Furthermore, courts have rendered the constitutional envi-
ronmental provisions relatively obscure by holding that they are not self-
executing.169 As a result, some of the states with constitutional provisions
"affirming the importance of the environment" have the weakest environ-
mental policies, while the five states with the strongest environmental poli-
cies have no environmental provisions in their constitutions.170
The 1972 Montana Constitution contains two sections setting forth ex-
press environmental rights and protections. Article II, § 3 states the "Ina-
lienable Rights":
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include
the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happi-
ness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corre-
sponding responsibilities. 171
The only right guaranteed by this provision is the right to a clean and
healthful environment.172 The others aspects of this section are described
as "temporizing," meaning "the right to pursue, enjoy or to seek."173 In the
1999 case Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of
Environmental Quality, the Montana Supreme Court solidified the impor-
tance of Article II, § 3 when it held that the right to a clean and healthful
environment is fundamental.174
The other key environmental provision of the Montana Constitution is
Article IX, "Environment and Natural Resources" which contains § 1, "Pro-
tection of the Environment":
(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and health-
ful environment in Montana for present and future generations. (2) The legis-
lature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty. (3)
The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the envi-
ronmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate reme-
dies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.
166. See e.g. id.
167. Mont. Const, art. II, § 3.
168. Thompson, supra n. 158, at 160.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 158-159.
171. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
172. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 163, at 31.
173. Id.
174. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999) [hereinafter
MEIC].
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This section had no counterpart in Montana's 1889 Constitution. Because
the Montana Supreme Court has deemed this section closely interrelated
with Article II, § 3, it is also deemed a fundamental right, so that any re-
striction of it triggers strict scrutiny.175
Article IX covers a broad range of people and activities. Drafters of
the Montana Constitution intended the "each person" language of Article
IX to include corporations and other business entities.17 6 The delegates in-
cluded the language ensuring the protection of an "environmental life sup-
port system" intentionally to include, but not be limited to, air, water and
land.' 77 As Delegate McNeil said: "the term 'environmental life-support
system' is all-encompassing including but not limited to air, water and land
and whatever interpretation is afforded this phrase by the Legislature and
courts, there is no question that it cannot be degraded."17 8 While implying
that there is some reasonable depletion or degradation of natural resources
that needs not be remedied, Subsection 3 appears to provide for absolute
protection of the environmental life-support system from nearly all forms of
degradation.
The Montana Environmental Policy Act was enacted to meet the con-
stitutional obligations of Article II, § 3 and Article IX.' 7 9 This Act ex-
pressly recognized that the State has a "continuing responsibility . . . to use
all practicable means consistent with other considerations of state policy ...
so that the state may fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee
of the environment for succeeding generations."s 0
Recognizing a cognizable right to a clean and healthful environment,
the important questions remaining for climate-change litigants are (1)
whether the constitutional provisions for a right to, and protection of, a
clean and healthful environment are self-executing and (2) whether those
provisions provide an independent basis in constitutional tort for breach of
these rights. Unfortunately, treatment of the right to, and protection of, a
clean and healthful environment by the Montana Supreme Court and legal
scholars has made answers to these questions unclear.
175. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 163, at 169.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Montana Constitutional Convention Proceedings, supra n. 163, at vol. 4, 1201 (emphasis ad-
ded).
179. Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-102(1) (2011).
180. Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-103(2).
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C. The Question of Whether the Right to a Clean and Healthful
Environment is Self-Executing
Constitutional rights that address language to the legislature are not
"self-executing" and require legislative action to make them effective.','
Those addressed to the courts are deemed self-executing.'8 2
1. Treating the Right as Self-Executing
The inclusion of the fundamental right to a clean and healthful envi-
ronment in the Montana Constitution makes questions of self-execution ar-
guably moot. Determining whether the right is self-executing is important
because a constitutional tort for the violation of a right can only exist for
self-executing rights. If a right is not self-executing, those who violate the
right will argue that it can provide no basis for a tort, unless the legislature
has activated the provision through legislation.
In 1999, the Montana Supreme Court first addressed the question of
whether the right to a clean and healthful environment was self-executing in
MEIC.'8 3 The Montana Legislature had amended the Water Quality Act by
passing Montana Code Annotated § 75-5-317(2)j), which excluded cer-
tain activities from review under the Act's non-degradation policy.18 4 The
Seven-Up Pete Joint Venture applied for a massive open-pit gold mine in
the upper Blackfoot River valley and petitioned to dump and mix arsenic-
contaminated waters into receiving waters of the Blackfoot and Landers
Fork Rivers.' 85 Under § 75-5-317(2)j), the DEQ approved the dumping.
Plaintiffs contended that the statute created an unconstitutional blanket ex-
clusion from review where the facts could show degradation would oc-
cur.186 The Court held the statute unconstitutional for violating Article IX,
§§ 1 and 3 of the Montana Constitution because it allowed discharges from
well-water tests to degrade high quality waters without review under Mon-
tana's non-degradation policy found at Montana Code Annotated
§ 75-5-303(3).187
More importantly, the MEIC Court held the right to a clean and health-
ful environment contained in the Montana Constitution was fundamental188
and said the mere degradation of water quality without actual injury is suffi-
181. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005).
182. Id.
183. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1244.
184. Id. at 1241; Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-317(2)(j) (1995).
185. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1237-1238.
186. Id. at 1241.
187. Id. at 1249; Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-303(3) (1995).
188. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1246.
2012 149
HeinOnline  -- 73 Mont. L. Rev. 149 2012
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
cient to implicate the fundamental right, triggering strict scrutiny analy-
sis: 189
[W]e conclude that the right to a clean and healthful environment is a funda-
mental right because it is guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights found at
Article II, Section 3 of Montana's Constitution, and that any statute or rule
which implicates that right must be strictly scrutinized and can only survive
scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state interest and that its action is
closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least onerous path that can
be taken to achieve the State's objective.1 90
Moreover, even though it is not found in the Declaration of Rights, the
Court went on to apply strict scrutiny to Article IX, § 1 as well.191 The
Court determined that "the right to a clean and healthful environment guar-
anteed by Article II, Section 3, and those rights provided for in Article IX,
Section 1 were intended by the constitution's framers to be interrelated and
interdependent and that state or private action which implicates either, must
be scrutinized consistently."l 92 The Court consequently stated that it would
apply strict scrutiny to actions implicating either Article II, § 3 or Article
IX, § 1.193
Having established the interdependent relationship between the two
provisions after a thorough review of debate and discussion in the 1972
Constitutional Convention, the Court concluded that they must be applied in
tandem.194 The Court supported this conclusion by quoting delegate Mc-
Neil:
Subsection (3) mandates the Legislature to provide adequate remedies to pro-
tect the environmental life-support system from degradation. The committee
intentionally avoided definitions, to preclude being restrictive. And the term
"environmental life support system" is all-encompassing, including but not
limited to air, water, and land; and whatever interpretation is afforded this
phrase by the Legislature and courts, there is no question that it cannot be
degraded.195
The Court then said:
We conclude, based on the eloquent record of the Montana Constitutional
Convention that to give effect to the rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 3
and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution they must be read to-
gether and consideration given to all of the provisions of Article IX, Section I
as well as the preamble to the Montana Constitution. In doing so, we con-
clude that the delegates' intention was to provide language and protections
189. Id. at 1249.
190. Id. at 1246 (emphasis in original).
191. Id. at 1245-1246.
192. Id. at 1246.
193. Id. at 1246.
194. MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1246.
195. Id. at 1247-1248 (emphasis in original) (citing Montana Constitutional Convention Proceed-
ings, supra n. 163, at vol. 4, 1201).
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which are both anticipatory and preventative. The delegates did not intend to
merely prohibit that degree of environmental degradation which can be con-
clusively linked to ill health or physical endangerment. Our constitution does
not require that dead fish float on the surface of our state's rivers and streams
before its farsighted environmental protections can be invoked. The delegates
repeatedly emphasized that the rights provided for in subparagraph (1) of Ar-
ticle IX, Section 1 was linked to the legislature's obligation in subparagraph
(3) to provide adequate remedies for degradation of the environmental life
support system and to prevent unreasonable degradation of natural re-
sources. 196
The MEIC decision certainly supports the conclusion that the constitu-
tional right to a clean and healthful environment is self-executing. In 2001,
Professors Larry Elison and Fritz Snyder of the University of Montana
School of Law wrote that delegates intended it to be self-executing "for
those whose health or property may be affected."1 97 In addition, Elison and
Snyder asserted that the delegates intended to guarantee to this and future
generations a clean and healthful environment.198 After MEIC, Barton
Thompson drew the conclusion that "the Montana constitutional provisions,
whether advisable or not, are self-executing . . . ."19
The MEIC decision was harshly criticized, however, by Professor John
Horwich of the University of Montana School of Law, 200 who said that the
decision assumed the provisions were self-executing without deciding the
issue of whether they actually were. 201 Particularly troubling was the fact
that Article IX, § 1 specifically provided that: "The legislature shall provide
for the administration and enforcement of this duty. The legislature shall
provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life sup-
port system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent un-
reasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources." 202 Horwich
noted that the practice in other appellate courts (whose decisions he alleged
the Court ignored) was to treat such provisions as enforceable by courts
only when the legislature had acted as required, which was not the case
when MEIC was decided. 2 0 3
In 2001, hard on the heels of MEIC, the Court in Cape-France Enter-
prises v. Estate of Peed invoked the constitutional right to a clean and
196. Id. at 1249.
197. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 163, at 33 (citing Mont. Const. Cony. Verbatim Transcr., supra n.
163, at vol. 5, 1645).
198. Elison & Snyder, supra n. 163, at 33 (citing Mont. Const. Cony. Verbatim Transcr., supra n.
163, at vol. 5, 1637).
199. Thompson, supra n. 165, at 160.
200. John. L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning of Montana's
Constitutional Environmental Provisions, 62 Mont. L. Rev. 269 (Summer 2001).
201. Id. at 284.
202. Mont. Const. art. IX, § I (internal numbering omitted).
203. Horwich, supra n. 200, at 282-287.
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healthful environment, voiding a contract between private parties. 2 0 4 Peed
entered a contract to purchase five acres of land near Bozeman, Montana
from Cape-France under a provision that the buyer had responsibility for
acquiring water for the proposed subdivision. 205 When Peed applied for a
drilling permit, the DEQ advised Cape-France that there was a pollution
plume in the groundwater near the property; that they would have to drill a
test well for the pollution; and that, if the pollution spread as a result of
drilling of the wells, Cape-France would be liable for the environmental
damage. 2 0 6 On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court
ruled that the agreement could be rescinded on the basis of mutual mistake
of fact and impracticability and impossibility of performance. 2 0 7 Peed ap-
pealed.2 0 8
In resolving the matter on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court invoked
the guarantee of Article II, § 3 that all persons in this State have a right to a
clean and healthful environment. 209 The Peed decision noted that if the
parties were to proceed with the subdivision, "the public would be exposed
to potential health risks and possible environmental degradation." 210
Again, the Peed decision confirmed the interrelationship of the "clean and
healthful environment" provision with the mandate of Article IX, § 1 that
"the State and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment in Montana for present and future generations." 21' The Court
pointed out that in MEIC it recognized that "the text of Article IX, Section 1
applies the protections and mandates of this provision to private action-
and thus to private parties-as well." 212 The Court continued by reasoning
that the subdivision would violate the protections and mandates of the con-
stitutional provisions for a clean and healthful environment. Thus, because
the object of the contract was unlawful, the Court voided it.213
Notably, Peed used the constitutional right to a clean and healthful
environment to void a contract between two private litigants. Peed, like
MEIC, certainly appeared to be based on a self-executing constitutional
right to a clean and healthful environment. The decisions that would follow
MEIC and Peed, however, are mystifying in that they do not appear to fol-
204. Cape-France Enters. v. Est. of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1016-1017 (Mont. 2001).
205. Id. at 1013.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1014.
208. Id. at 1012-1013.
209. Id. at 1016.
210. Peed, 29 P.3d at 1016.
211. Id. at 1017 (ellipses omitted).
212. Id. (citing MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1246).
213. Id. at 1017.
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low, distinguish, or repudiate those cases. As the reader will see, the Court
treated them as if they did not exist.
2. Treating the Question of Self-Execution as Unanswered
In 2002, in Dorwart v. Caraway,214 the Court posed this broad ques-
tion: "Does a violation of rights guaranteed by the Montana Constitution
give rise to a cause of action for damages?" 2 15 The Court noted that "[b]y
1998, twenty-one states had recognized an implicit cause of action for state
constitutional violations," while three states indicated they would do so
under narrow circumstances, and four had statutory provisions recognizing
such actions. 216 Seven states specifically rejected constitutional causes of
action. 217 In answering the question, the Montana Supreme Court relied on
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 18 and the English common-
law principle that a violation of individual rights preserved in a fundamental
document could be remedied by a traditional action for damages. 219 The
Dorwart Court followed Bivens and § 874A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, holding that a person could recover money damages if the govern-
ment violated the rights guaranteed by Article II, §§ 10 (right of privacy),
11 (freedom from unreasonable search and seizure), or 17 (right to due pro-
cess) of the Montana Constitution.2 2 0 The Court concluded that those three
constitutional provisions were self-executing. 2 2 1 Dorwart made no com-
ment on MEIC or Peed.
The Court limited its holding to rights of privacy, due process, and
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures because they protect from
wrongs committed by persons acting with the authority of the state, distin-
guishable from wrongs committed by a private individual.222 Notably, the
Court asserted "Constitutional rights that cannot be enforced are illusory. It
is as if those rights cease to exist as legal rights." 2 2 3 Justice Nelson spe-
cially concurred, arguing that provisions of the Montana Constitution guar-
anteeing fundamental rights are self-executing. 224
214. Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 (Mont. 2002).
215. Id. at 133.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
219. Dorwart, 58 P.3d at 134-135.
220. Id. at 136.
221. Id. at 141.
222. Id. at 136.
223. Id. at 145 (quoting Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J.,
concurring)).
224. Id. at 147 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
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Both proponents and opponents of a self-executing right cite Columbia
Falls Elementary School District No. 6 v. Montana225 to support their posi-
tions. There, the Court said, "[t]o determine whether the provision is self-
executing, we ask whether the Constitution addresses the language to the
courts or to the Legislature. If addressed to the Legislature, the provision is
non-self-executing; if addressed to the courts, it is self-executing." 2 2 6 How-
ever, the Court also said that "provisions that directly implicate rights guar-
anteed to individuals under our Constitution are in a category of their own,"
giving the Courts, as final interpreters of the Constitution, the "'obligation
to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Consti-
tution.' "227
Under Columbia Falls Elementary School District No. 6, the right to a
clean and healthful environment provided by Article II, § 3 would be ad-
dressed to the courts and therefore self-executing. On the other hand, the
protection of the environment under Article IX, § 1 is clearly addressed to
the Legislature. In 1942, the Montana Supreme Court in State ex rel. Staf-
ford v. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corp.228 established the "Stafford rule" that
non-self-executing clauses of the Constitution present non-justiciable politi-
cal questions that depend on the Legislature for execution. 229 However, the
fact that in MEIC the Court found the two clauses to be so interrelated that
they must be read together and protected under a strict scrutiny standard
likely overrides Stafford's simple rule. Moreover, the right to a clean and
healthful environment is the only right guaranteed by Article II, § 3, and the
Court declared it a fundamental right. Therefore, it falls in the class of
rights the Columbia Falls Court described as "in a category of their own,"
giving courts the "obligation to guard, enforce, and protect" it.230
In Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc.,2 3 1 the Court again
treated the self-execution issue as an open question, as though MEIC had
never been decided. 232 Remarkably, the Court purported to defer deciding
that issue under the principle that it should avoid constitutional issues wher-
ever possible:
The parties fully briefed this question and presented oral argument to the
Court. In fact, we expressly framed the issues to be presented at oral argu-
ment to include whether "the right to a clean and healthful environment, Arti-
cle II, Section 3, Constitution of Montana, is self-executing?" This Court re-
225. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No., 109 P.3d 257.
226. Id. at 260 (internal citations omitted).
227. Id. at 260-261 (quoting Robb v. Connolly, Ill U.S. 624, 637 (1884) (ellipses omitted)).
228. State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 132 P.2d 689 (Mont. 1942).
229. Id. at 700.
230. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6, 109 P.3d at 261.
231. Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007).
232. Id. at 1093.
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peatedly has recognized, however, that courts should avoid constitutional is-
sues whenever possible. We deem it possible in light of our decision in
Dorwart to resolve this case without resort to determining whether Article II,
Section 3, is self-executing and consequently could support a private cause of
action for monetary damages. 233
Because the Sunburst Court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 to
provide for restoration damages, which it considered an adequate remedy to
ensure a clean and healthful environment, it was relieved of deciding
whether Article II, § 3 was self-executing. 2 3 4 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Nelson said he read the majority opinion to reject, per se, a constitu-
tional tort for violations under Article II, § 3. According to Justice Nelson,
the Court's opinion simply held that it was not necessary to discuss the
issue in this case and that a future case may require the Court to address the
constitutional tort theory. 235
In her concurrence and dissent, Chief Justice Karla Gray disagreed
with the position that Article II, § 3 "compelled" restoration damages, sub-
mitting instead that Texaco's argument was that Article II, § 3 was not self-
executing. 2 3 6 Sunburst illustrates that the Court was aware of the implica-
tions of any decision as to whether the guarantee of a clean and healthful
environment is self-executing and that the majority was unwilling to an-
nounce that the right was self-executing or the basis for a constitutional tort.
Sunburst indicates that, where the landowners have complete legal redress,
the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment does not au-
thorize a distinct cause of action in tort for money damages between two
private parties.237 Justice Nelson left the door open for a future holding that
there is a constitutional tort for violation of the fundamental right to a clean
and healthful environment.238
In 2007, in Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corp., the Court followed
the Sunburst decision when it denied the plaintiffs' constitutional tort claim
because they had adequate, alternative tort claims. 2 3 9 The plaintiffs in
Shammel brought claims for damages caused to their natural water supply
by the mining activity of Canyon Resources Corporation. 2 4 0 The claims
were based in trespass, negligence, nuisance, and constitutional tort.24' The
Court held that the landowners could not support their claims for money
damages with the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment
233. Id. (internal citation omitted).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1098 (Nelson, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
236. Id. at 1110 (Gray, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corp., 167 P.3d 886, 888 (Mont. 2007).
238. Id. at 888.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 887.
241. Id.
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because they had adequate tort claims for money damages, including resto-
ration claims recognized in Sunburst and the equitable relief of remedia-
tion.242
Sunburst and Shammel raise two critical questions with regard to cli-
mate-change litigation. First, each case mentioned the apparently pivotal
fact that the litigation was between two private parties, raising the question
of whether similar litigation would be actionable against a government en-
tity for breach of its duty to address climate change. Second, these cases
raise the issue of whether a plaintiff can bring a constitutional tort claim
based on climate change if there is potential for redress through traditional
tort claims of negligence, trespass, or nuisance. The very nature of green-
house-gas pollution and the fact that its catastrophic damage will manifest
decades from now makes it uncertain that the classic tort remedies will
provide full legal redress. In climate-change litigation, Sunburst and Sham-
mel provide potential authority for recognizing the constitutional tort of
breach of duty to provide a clean and healthful environment.
VII. PRESENT STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
In recent years, federal and state courts have begun processing an in-
creasing array of important climate change lawsuits raising issues of liabil-
ity and damages. This litigation is occurring while legislative and adminis-
trative branches are still ignoring or debating the existence of climate
change. The law firm Arnold & Porter, LLP, has created and maintains an
excellent, comprehensive chart of climate change litigation in the United
States. 2 4 3 From its work, it appears that ongoing climate change litigation
fits into four basic categories. The first category is statutory claims. In-
cluded in this category are claims that aim to force the government to act
under the Clean Air Act and climate-regulating statutes. Other statutory
claims (including industry lawsuits against government) aim to stop govern-
ment action under National Environmental Policy Act2 44 and similar state
and federal administrative procedures acts. Still other statutory claims at-
tempt to regulate private conduct.
The second category consists of common law claims seeking injunc-
tive relief and money damages. This category includes the famous cases of
Connecticut v. American Electric Power2 4 5 (seeking to enjoin the largest
coal fired electrical generating companies in the U.S.), Native Village of
Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corporation246 (seeking money reparations for
242. Id. at 888.
243. Gerrard & Howe, supra n. 88.
244. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
245. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011).
246. Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
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erosion and loss of the beaches supporting the village), and Comer v. Mur-
phy Oil USA, Inc.2 4 7 (seeking damages for increasing the intensity of Hurri-
cane Katrina caused by defendants' contributions to global warming).
The third category of climate actions involves public international law
claims, such as the Inuit Petition to Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights,2 48 which would include climate-change actions seeking reparations
or other remedies for injury to global peoples or communities already suf-
fering from the effects of climate change.
The fourth category does not directly involve climate-change torts; it is
comprised of disputes between climate change deniers and climate change
advocates and scientists. 249
The climate-change actions tracked by Arnold & Porter, LLP, number
in the hundreds and have virtually all been filed in the last four years.
Some are filed in common law courts, while others consist of petitions for
rule making, etc., filed with state and federal agencies. Analysis of the
claims indicates that a significant number have been dismissed on grounds
such as lack of standing, preemption, or political question. Many of those
are on appeal and can be expected, like Massachusetts v. EPA, to result in
the making of significant appellate law. Climate change litigation will
likely involve extensive and prolonged discovery and pretrial motions.
Consequently, the tracked cases have not been to trial; the absence of jury
verdicts or appeals of jury verdicts is therefore not surprising. As pretrial
dismissals are appealed, and as cases reach trial, one can predict that the
decisions will create a body of climate change law that will provide a
stronger foundation for addressing climate change in the courts.
VIII. THE INITIAL APPEARANCE OF PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE
MONTANA CONSTITUTION IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
The case of Barhaugh v. Montana was initiated on May 4, 2011, as a
petition invoking the Montana Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to hear
legal constitutional issues of major statewide importance in urgent or emer-
gency circumstances that make the normal litigation and appeal process in-
adequate. 250 The petitioners were twelve Montana youth from grade
247. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-860 (5th Cir. 2009).
248. Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief From Violations
Resulting From Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States at 70 (available
at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICCPetition_7DecO5.pdf) (Dec. 7, 2005).
249. See e.g. Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Servin, 2011 WL 871735 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2011); see also
Koch Indus., Inc. v. Does, 2011 WL 1775765 (D. Utah May 9, 2011).
250. Pet. for Original Jxn. at 2, Barhaugh v. Mont., No. OP 11-0258 (Mont. Sup. Ct. May 4,
2011) (available at http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/case?case=14512); Mont. R. App. P. 14(4);
Mont. Const. art. Vl, § 2.
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school to college age who claimed standing "because their personal and
economic well-being . . . [was] threatened with injury by wild fire, loss of
water resources, changes in precipitation patterns, extreme weather events,
flood, beetle kill and other consequences of climate change." 2 5 1 The peti-
tion asked the Court to declare that:
(1) The State holds the atmosphere in trust for the present and future citizens
of the state of Montana; and (2) The State of Montana has the affirmative
duty to protect and preserve the atmospheric trust, including establishing and
enforcing limitations on the levels of greenhouse gas emissions as necessary
to mitigate human-caused climate change.252
The litigation arose out of the state's failure to address global warming
in spite of the 54 recommendations in the 2007 report of the Climate
Change Advisory Committee.2 5 3 The petition alleged that the State govern-
ment had unlawfully failed to address greenhouse gas pollution and that the
Legislature effectively blocked greenhouse-gas rulemaking proceedings fol-
lowing the EPA's determination that greenhouse gasses constitute pollu-
tants.254
The petition was grounded in the public trust doctrine and the "clean
and healthful environment" guarantees of the Montana Constitution as well
as the Montana Environmental Policy Act, which incorporated those guar-
antees and vested the State with "continuing responsibility" to implement
them. 2 5 5 Petitioners chose to file an original petition with the Montana Su-
preme Court because the case could have resulted in the Court's declara-
tion-in 60 days or less-that the State was responsible for protecting the
atmosphere under the public trust doctrine. That declaration by an appellate
court could be of great assistance as precedent for other climate-change
actions.
The Court, however, denied the petition and dismissed the action on
procedural grounds, making findings that the petition did not involve purely
legal questions and it did not involve urgency or emergency factors that
would preclude litigation in a trial court followed by the normal appeal
process.256 The Court noted that the petition was part of a nationwide effort
known as the Atmospheric Trust Litigation 2 5 7 and asserted that the Montana
action was the only one filed as an original petition on the ground of urgent
251. Pet. for Original Jxn. at 1, Barhaugh v. Mont., No. OP 11-0258.
252. Id. at 16.
253. Montana Climate Change Advisory Committee, Montana Climate Change Action Plan at
EX-2.
254. Pet. for Original Jxn. at 7-8, Barhaugh v. Mont., No. OP 11-0258.
255. Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-103(2).
256. Or. 7-8, Barhaugh v. Mont., OP 11-0258 (Mont. Sup. Ct. June 15, 2011) (available at http:
http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/case?case= 145 12).
257. Id. at 2. Atmospheric Trust Litigation ("ATL") is a volunteer organization of lawyers from
many states and a handful of foreign countries which acted in concert for purposes of filing climate
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or emergency circumstances. 258 Consequently, the merits could not be
heard as an original petition but would have to be filed in a state district
court. The decision contains no ruling or dicta relevant to global warming
or its causes.259 As of this writing, the case has not been filed in a state
district court, and counsel are evaluating the options.
IX. GOING FORWARD
The Montana Constitution and Montana Supreme Court decisions rec-
ognizing the public trust doctrine constitute the foundational underpinnings
for climate change jurisprudence in this state. Montana law is particularly
poised to allow application of the public trust doctrine for the protection of
the atmosphere. Two things are necessary, however, for Montana to lead
the way in climate change litigation. First, the Court needs to clarify that
the fundamental right to a clean and healthful environment found in the
Montana Constitution is self-executing, so as to provide a legal basis to
protect the air from harmful greenhouse gases. The right to a clean and
healthful environment is the first of the fundamental rights mentioned in our
Constitution. It becomes meaningless if it exists only insofar as the legisla-
ture sees fit to effectuate it. The door is still open for the Court to clarify
that it has not overturned or distinguished MEIC or Peed, which were cor-
rectly decided because of the inextricable interrelationship and interdepen-
dence of the "right to a clean and healthful environment" clause of Article
11, § 3 and Article IX. Second, Montana Courts should apply the public
trust doctrine to the air under Article II, § 3 and Article IX, which are in
accord with such an expansion. By their nature, common-law doctrines in
general and the public trust doctrine in particular are flexible enough to
accommodate extensions of the law to fit the needs of society. There can be
no more pressing need than the protection of the air that sustains the bio-
sphere.
X. CONCLusioN
By virtue of its strong common-law recognition of the public trust doc-
trine and the environmental provisions of its 1972 Constitution, Montana is
a uniquely suited forum for climate-change lawsuits in the civil justice sys-
tem. Montana jurisprudence includes ample precedent that recognizes and
applies the public trust doctrine in protection of navigational and recrea-
tional waters. There appears to be no sound theoretical basis for a govern-
change lawsuits or rule-making petitions in all states in early May 2011. ATL reports to the author that
rulemaking petitions or civil suits were filed in 37 states.
258. Id.
259. See id.
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ment to impose a trust on navigable waters and not navigable air and air-
ways. Moreover, the Montana Constitution provides the underpinnings for
using public trust doctrine for protection of the atmosphere and airways.
By its nature, common law has historically been flexible and subject to
extension. One would be hard-pressed to cite a situation in human history
that makes a more compelling argument to extend the law to protect the
public than climate change resulting from global warming. If resort to the
judicial branch of government is to have any effect on the climate crisis,
those litigating the cases will have to move quickly and seek remedies with
the highest impact and most visibility. The public trust doctrine and the
environmental provisions of the Montana Constitution may be the most ef-
fective tools in the litigation arsenal.
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